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STATUTORY ESTOPPEL BY DEED
STATUTORY ESTOPPEL BY DEED
ROBERT W. SWENSONt
The modern law of real property is notoriously deficient in the
devices which it offers for protecting a purchaser of land from
the financial loss which will result if he fails to receive a good
title from his vendor. If the purchaser obtains a deed containing
covenants for title, he may have an action for damages for breach
of the covenants. In most jurisdictions, this merely amounts to
restoration of the purchase price plus interest. If the covenant
is the type which "runs with the land," the buyer may have
the option to sue a remote covenantor in the chain of title. The
protection afforded by the covenant is, of course, limited by the
financial responsibility of the covenantor.
A purchaser of land also has the benefit of the recording act
in the jurisdiction where the land is located. As a general propo-
sition, deeds and instruments creating various types of incum-
brances, if unrecorded, are of no effect against a subsequent bona
fide purchaser of the land. These recording acts are frequently
either worded or judicially construed in such a manner as to
afford purchasers the very minimum protection. Title examina-
tion has come to involve an appraisal of a chain of title evidenced
by the recorded conveyances and other instruments affecting the
title. In most states, this appraisal is made by lawyers on the
basis of an abstract of title prepared by a professional title
searcher. Errors in reporting the true condition of the title may
be made by the recorder or by the abstracter. And occasionally
lawyers have been known to err in examining the abstract-a
fact which is not startling in view of the voluminous nature of
most abstracts of title. If these pitfalls have been successfully
avoided, the purchaser must still be apprised of the fact that
there are many claims or incumbrances which are not required
to appear of record but which are nevertheless effective even
against a purchaser who has no knowledge of them.'
Since the above devices offer inadequate protection to pur-
chasers of land, conveyancers in recent years have been turning
to title insurance, title registration in some states, or the new
t Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.
1. PATTON, TITLES 138 n. 58 (1938), lists many such defects. See also
Rood, Registration of Land Titles, 12 Mlca. L. REv. 379, 389-393 (1914).
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,comprehensive statute of limitations. Title insurance is only as
good as the coverage of the policy itself, and the desirability of
title registration is still being disputed by the experts. The new
all-inclusive statutes of limitations or "merchantable title stat-
utes," as they are sometimes called, have not yet been completely
tested in the courts.2
The buyer of land has another possible source of protection
not mentioned above. It is available, however, only in the very
rare case. Suppose X executes a deed conveying Blackacre to Y.
The instrument contains either express or statutory implied
covenants for title, or a recital by X that he is the owner. Actu-
ally X has no title. If he later acquires title, he will be estopped
to deny that title passed by the deed. This principle is popularly
called "estoppel by deed" or "estoppel to assert an after-acquired
title." It is a subject -which appears to intrigue the conveyances
instructor and student alike.3 It is treated at length in texts and
legal periodicals.4 Much of the writing on the subject has sought
to clarify the exact manner in which the rule operates: does it
give rise merely to a personal estoppel against the grantor and,
as such, constitute an equitable concept, or is the after-acquired
title to be regarded as actually passing to the grantee? That
question may sound rather metaphysical but it has frequently,
nevertheless, been regarded by the courts as decisive of certain
types of cases. Specifically, it may influence the solutions to the
following problems:
(1) Has the estoppel grantee the right to elect either to take
the after-acquired title or to sue for damages on the covenants
for title contained in the deed? The conveyee's decision will
2. Iowa has had a statute of this type since 1919. The present section
appears in IOWA CODE § 614.17 (1946). For a good discussion of the history
and recent popularity of such legislation, see Note, 33 MINN. L. REv. 54(1948).
3. Almost all conveyances casebooks contain a chapter devoted to estoppel
by deed. See KIRKWOOD, CASES ON CONVEYANCES c. 6 (2d ed. 1941);
MARTIN, CASES ON CONVEYANCES C. 7 (1939). One of the best collections of
cases is the AIGLEB, CASES ON TnILs c. 7 (3d ed. 1942).
As far as the student is concerned, it appears to be a favorite pastime
to coin names for the "doctrine," using phrases which are vocally descrip-
tive of the speed with which the after-acquired title is supposed to pass to
the grantee. A sort of legalistic onomatopoeia, if you like!
4. The standard work is RAwLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE c. 11 (5th ed.
1887); see also BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL ch. 11 (6th ed. 1913); 4 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY §§ 1230-1234 (3d ed. 1939).
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usually be predicated upon the change, if any, in the value of the
land since the time of the original conveyance.
(2) Will the estoppel grantee prevail over a good faith pur-
chaser or mortgagee from the grantor after the latter acquires
title? What if the mortgage is a purchase-money mortgage?
(3) What are the rights of a creditor of the grantor who ob-
tained a judgment (a) prior to the original conveyance; (b)
between the time of the original conveyance and the later ac-
quisition of title; or (c) after the title was acquired?
(4) If the grantor is married after the conveyance but before
he acquires title, has the spouse an inchoate dower right?
(5) In an action of ej ectment by the grantor against one who
is wrongfully in possession, may the defendant defeat the action
by showing that the estoppel grantee, not the plaintiff, is the true
owner?
The above problems have met with a variety of solutions in
the courts of the United States. It is not the purpose of this
comment to review the decisions generally. Rather the discus-
sion herein is limited to the effect of statutory restatements of
the estoppel principle on these questions. Practically no atten-
tion has been given by the writers to these statutes. It is hoped
that it may be helpful to classify these statutes and to observe
the manner in which they have been interpreted by the courts.
The purpose of this comment is to determine whether the stat-
utes have made any conspicuous contribution to the general law
of estoppel by deed and whether their influence has been as
"pernicious" as some of the writers in the past have suggested.5
I. THE STATUTES AND THEIR HISTORY
Type One. The first statute in the United States on estoppel
to assert an after-acquired title appears to have been the Mis-
souri statute of 1825.6 At best, it was a clumsy job of drafting.
5. RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLn § 248 (5th ed. 1887). The first edition
in 1852 contained no reference to the statutes, and the third edition in 1860
contained only a brief summary of the statutes in Missouri and Arkansas(at p. 411). In the last edition, the statutes are vigorously attacked. This
appears to have had little effect on the legislatures, although Rawle's
theories on estoppel have had tremendous influence on the courts. The
statutes are also criticized in BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 449-450 n. 3 (6th ed.
1913), and specific suggestions for the revision of the Kansas statute are
given.
6. 1 Mo. Laws (1825) Conveyances, § 6, p. 217. "...f any person
shall sell and convey to another, by deed or conveyance, purporting to con-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The act applied to any deed "purporting to convey an estate in
fee simple absolute" and executed by one who had no title. The
Missouri Supreme Court construed this to mean that a deed
containing no covenants for title may be the basis for estoppel,
although a mere quitclaim or a special warranty deed was not
within the purview of the statute.7 Since the statute specified
the conveyance of an estate in "fee simple absolute," a lease of
a term for years or a deed purporting to convey an estate less
than fee simple, such as a life estate, would seem to be outside
the statute.8 The statute further provided that the effect of the
vey an estate in fee simple absolute, in any tract of land, or real estate,
lying and being in this state, not then being possessed of the legal estate or
interest therein, at the time of the sale and conveyance, but after such sale
and conveyance, the vendor shall become possessed of and confirmed in the
legal estate to the land or real estate, so sold and conveyed, it shall be taken
and held to be in trust, and for the use of the grantee or vendee, and the
conveyance aforesaid shall be held and taken, and shall be valid as if the
vendor or grantor had the legal estate or interest at the time of said sale
or conveyance."
In Norcum v. Gaty, 19 Mo. 65, 70 (1853), the Court indicated that the
statute was not based on any principle of the Spanish law.
7. Boagy v. Shoab, 13 Mo. 365 (1850); see also Frink v. Darst, 14 I1.
304 (1853). By statute, the following covenants for title are implied from
the use of the words "grant, bargain and sell" in all conveyances of an
estate in fee simple: that the grantor is seised of an indefeasible estate in
fee simple; that the land is free from incumbrances done or suffered by the
grantor; for further assurances. Mo Rnv. STAT. § 3407 (1939). The Mis-
souri estoppel statute applies to deeds containing these statutory covenants.
Hume v. Hopkins, 140 Mo. 65, 41 S. W. 784 (1897); Fordyce v. Rapp, 131
Mo. 354, 33 S. W. 57 (1895); Foote v. Clark, 102 Mo. 394, 14 S. W. 981;
but see Chauvin v. Wagner, 18 Mo. 531, 553 (1853). The estoppel statute
has no application to a quitclaim deed, containing no representation that
the grantor has an estate of any particular quantum. Valle v. Clemens,
18 Mo. 486 (1853); Gibson v. Chouteau, 39 Mo. 536 (1866), reversed on
other grounds on rehearing, 39 Mo. 585 (1867), writ of error dismissed,
8 Wall. 314 (U. S. 1869); cf. Inlow v. Herron, 306 Mo. 42, 267 S. W. 893(1924). Nevertheless, if the grantor had an equitable title at the time he
executed the quitclaim, a subsequently-acquired legal title inures to
the benefit of the grantee. Hafner v. St. Louis, 161 Mo 34 61 S. W. 632(1901); see Reasor v. Marshall, 221 S. W. 2d 111 (Mo. 19495; of. Callahan
v. Davis, 90 Mo. 78, 2 S. W. 216 (1886).
8. In Geyer v. Girard, 22 Mo. 159, 160 (1855), speaking of the 1835
act, it was said that the estop]pel statute "relates only to estates conveyed
in fee simple absolute, and in its terms to no other estates." In that case,
a lessee of a term for years gave a trust deed, apparently containing cove-
nants, to his lessor to secure a promisory note for $100 which the lessee
agreed to pay to the lessor in addition to the rent reserved in the lease.
It was later discovered that the lessor had no title. When the lessee ob-
tained a lease from the true owner, the original lessor sought to enforce his
lien against the interest subsequently acquired by the lessee. The court
simply held that the lien of the deed of trust was coextensive with the
estate actually received by the lessee. Since the lessor had no title, the
deed of trust did not attach to any after-acquired title of the lessee. The
same rule is frequently applied to purchase-money mortgages where the
1 364
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acquisition of title by the grantor after the conveyance was two-
fold: (1) the title ". . . shall be taken and held to be in trust,
and for the use of the grantee..."; and (2) the first conveyance
"shall be valid as if the vendor or grantor had the legal estate...
at the time of . . . conveyance." These two propositions seem
inconsistent. The first might be construed to mean that the
estoppel grantee acquires only an equitable right to compel a
conveyance from his grantor after the latter acquires title. On
the other hand, the phrase "for the use of the grantee" .might
lend itself to the construction that a passive use arises when the
grantor acquires title. If the use is of the type that is executed
by the Statute of Uses, the after-acquired legal title would actu-
ally pass to the grantee.9 This result would be in accord with
the second proposition of the statute, for if the original convey-
ance is to be regarded as though the grantor had title at the time
of its execution, the title itself must necessarily pass to the
grantee. Another defect in the statute is that it is not certain
whether it applies where the grantor has purported to convey
in fee simple but later acquires an estate less than fee. Appar-
ently the lesser estate will not pass to the grantee, at least under
the statute.'
The Missouri act was borrowed by Illinois in 182711 and much
vendor has no title and the vendee subsequently acquired title from the
true owner. The covenants in the mortgage given by the vendee will not
raise an estoppel. Nelson v. Dwiggins, 111 Fla. 298, 149 So. 613 (1933);
contra, Clark v. Baker, 14 Cal. 612 (1860); see also Jackson v. Holt, 192
Miss. 702, 6 S. 2d 915 (1942).
The Geyer case, supra, was not intended to apply to the situation where
a lessor acquires title after giving a lease. The lessee is entitled to the
benefit of the estoppel doctrine. If this result cannot be achieved under the
statute, it should be reached as a matter of general law. See Liberal Sav-
ings & Loan Co. v. Frankel Realty Co., 137 Ohio St. 489, 30 N. E. 2d 1012,
1016 (1940).
9. A few states have adopted the "trust theory" where there is no
estoppel statute. See Donohue v. Vosper, 189 Mich. 78, 155 N. W. 407(1915); Rose v. Agee, 128 Va. 502, 104 S. E. 827 (1920). For changes in
the Virginia law, see note 41 infra.
It has been said that the trust which arises is either an implied or con-
structive trust and therefore not within the Statute of Uses. See Lawler,
Estoppel to Assert An After-Acquired Title in Pennsylvania, 3 U. oF PiTT.
L. REv. 165, 178 (1937). If it is a statutory trust, as here, perhaps a differ-
ent result should be reached.
10. Simonton, Statutory Covenants for Title in Missour4 28 U. op Mo.
BULL. L. SE. 3, 30 (1923).
11. Ill. Rev. Laws 1826-7, Conveyances 95-102; ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. c.
30, § 6 (Smith-Hurd 1934).
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later by Colorado. 12 Both states still have the statute in this form
on their books.
Type Two. Missouri legislators, not content with the initial
form of their statutes, revised it in 1835.13 This revision has
served as the model for Conveyances Acts in several other states.
Under the revision, the statute still applied to deeds purporting
to transfer a "fee simple absolute," but the two inconsistent
statements as to the effect of later acquisition of title were clari-
fied. The "trust theory" was eliminated, and in its place was
substituted the rigid, mechanical concept of actual passage of
title to the grantee, seemingly without exception. It was stated
that the after-acquired title "shall immediately pass to the
grantee," the conveyance still being regarded as though the
grantor had title at the date of its execution. The new statute
appeared again in the Revised Statutes of 1845 and 1855, with
changes only in punctuation.14
The revised statute of Missouri was used by Arkansas in 1837
as the basis for its statute." Two significant changes were intro-
duced. One was that the estoppel by deed principle applied to
deeds purporting to convey land either in fee simple absolute or
"any less estate." The second innovation was the insertion of a
statement that an after-acquired equitable as well as legal title
would pass to the grantee. No change was made in the theory
that title actually passes to the grantee. The Arkansas statute
remains today in the same form.16
The Missouri statute of 1835 appeared in the Conveyances Act
of the Revised Statutes of the Territory of Iowa in 1843.17 It
was identical to the Missouri provision except that, in a separate
section, the term "real estate" was defined as "embracing chat-
tels real." The statute probably, therefore, applied to leases of
12. CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 40, § 5 (1935).
13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 3 Conveyances (3d ed. 1841). The 1855 statute is
quoted here because of clarification in punctuation: "If any person shall
convey any real estate, by conveyance, purporting to convey the same in
fee simple absolute, and shall not, at the time of such conveyance, have
the legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same,
the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee,
and such conveyance shall be valid, as if such legal estate had been in the
grantor at the time of the conveyance."
14. Mo. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 3 (Jones, 1845); Mo. REv. STAT. c. 32, § 3(1855).
15. AIRK
. 
REV. STAT. c. 31, § 4 (1838) effective November 30, 1837.
16. ARK. STAT. § 50-404 (1947 Off. Ed.).
17. IOWA TEnRITORY REV. STAT. c. 54, § 3 (1843) [1911 reprint].
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terms for years. That is not free from doubt, however, since the
principal statute refers to conveyances of real estate in fee sim-
ple, and it is hard to imagine what could be meant by a convey-
ance of a chattel real in fee simple. Iowa revised the statute in
1851, as will appear below. The 1835 Missouri act was adopted
in 1850 in California,1 but was later changed with the adoption
of the Civil Code in 1872. The Missouri act also appears in the
current Nevada and Utah statutes. 19 The Utah statute adds the
phrase that the subsequently acquired title immediately passes
to the grantee, "his heirs, successors or assigns. ' 20 This clarifies
any doubt there might be as to whether the estoppel runs with
the land.,'
Type Three. In 1851, the early Iowa statute was revised, and
its rewording eliminated some of the construction problems pres-
ent in the earlier enactment. The estoppel doctrine was ap-
proached from a new point of view. The statute provided:
Where a deed purports to convey a greater interest than
the grantor was at the time possessed of, any after acquired
interest of such grantor to the extent of that which the deed
purports to convey enures to the benefit of the grantee.22
The statute wisely substitutes the phrase "purports to convey
a greater interest" for the uncertain phrase" purports to convey
in fee simple," found in the Missouri statute. The significant
provision in the statute, however, relates to the manner in which
the doctrine operates. The after-acquired interest, to the extent
purported to be conveyed "enures" to the benefit of the grantee.
This seems substantially different from the Missouri version of
title "immediately passing" to the grantee. The Iowa approach
seems to be no more than a restatement of the rule as it exists
under the general American common law. The word "inure" or
"enure" does not necesarily imply passage of title to the grantee
in all situations and without exception.2 3 It leaves open the pos-
sibility of applying equitable principles where necessary. On one
18. CAL. STAT. C. 101 § 33 (1850).
19. NEv. CoMP. LAWS § 1506 (1929); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-1-9 (1943).
20. See aso WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10571 (Remington, 1931); CAL.
Crv. CODE:, Div. 2, Pt. 4, tit. 4 c. 2, Art. 2, § 1106 (Deering, 1949).
21. See Johnson v. Johnson, 170 Mo. 34, 70 S. W. 241 (1902).
22. IOWA CODE c. 78, § 1202 (1851) [1912 reprint].
23. The word "inure" is defined for another purpose in Cedar Rapids
Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 234, 91 N. W. 1081 (1902), writ of
error dismissed, 199 U. S. 600 (1905). The word "enure," used in the 1851
act, was changed to "inure" in the 1897 code. IOWA CODE c. 5, § 2915 (2d ed.
(1897).
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occasion at least this interpretation was given the statute by the
Iowa court.24 In other cases, it has spoken of the statute as hav-
ing the effect of passing title to the grantee.25
The Iowa statute remained unchanged until 1897 when a sen-
tence was added to the effect that the principle had no application
where a spouse joined in the conveyance merely for the purpose
of relinquishing dower or homestead rights and subsequently
acquired in his or her own right an interest in the land.2 This
was in accord with early Iowa decisions and settled a matter
which has received varied treatments in other jurisdictions.27
No changes have been made in the Iowa statute since 1897.
The 1851 Iowa statute was adopted in Nebraska.28 A new
proviso was inserted that the title subsequently acquired would
not inure to the grantee or his heirs or assigns, if the deed was
either a quitclaim or special warranty.29 The statute also pro-
vides that the original grantor is not estopped from acquiring
the title at a judicial sale upon execution against the grantee or
those claiming under him, or at a tax sale for taxes becoming
due after the conveyance. Other jurisdictions have established,
by judicial decision, the same exception where the grantor later
acquires an original title at a judicial"° or tax sale.2 1
24. See Morgan v. Graham, 35 Iowa 213 (1872), discussed in note 50
in! ra. In Purcell v. Gann, 113 Ark. 332, 168 S. W. 1102, 1105 (1914), it
was said that the Arkansas statute "must be reasonably construed so as
to effectutate its purposes" and not to "defeat the ends of justice."
25. See cases cited note 58 infra.
26. IowA CODE, tit. xiv, c. 5, § 2915 (2d. 1897).
27. Childs v. McChesney, 20 Iowa 431 (1866); O'Neil v. Vanderburg, 25
rowa 105 (1868). For other methods of treating the problem, see State v.
Kemmerer, 15 S. D. 504, 90 N. W. 150 (1902) (on rehearing); Weegens
v. Karels, 374 Ill. 273, 29 N. E. 2d 248 (1940); Grasswick v. Miller, 82
Mont. 364, 267 Pac. 299 (1928); of. Powell v. Bowen, 279 Mo. 280, 214
S. W. 142 (1919) ; and Brawford v. Wolfe, 103 Mo. 391, 15 S. W. 426 (1891).
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-209 (1943).
29. A similar result as to the special warranty deed was reached in
Boagy v. Shoab, 13 Mo. 365 (1850). The exception in the case of the quit-
claim (containing no covenants for title and no representation of owner-
ship of an estate of a particular quantum) is usual. In Mississippi, however,
it is expressly provided that a quitclaim and release "shall estop the grantor
and his heirs from asserting a subsequently acquired title.. .". MIss. CODE§ 846 (1942). This appears to be the only statute of this type. Compare
statutes of the type referred to in note 37, infra.
30. Rowell v. Rowell, 119 Mont. 201, 174 P. 2d 223 (1946); McCune v.
McCune, 23 Cal. App. 2d 295, 72 P. 2d 883 (1937); Schultz v. dities Service
Oil Co., 149 Kan. 148, 36 P. 2d 533 (1939).
31. Foster v. Johnson, 89 Tex. 640, 36 S. W. 67 (1896); Ervin v. Morris,
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Type Four. Missouri again revised its statute in 1866, which
is its present form.3 2 The only significant change in the statute
is the statement that the statute applies to conveyances of an
"indefeasible estate in fee simple absolute." The word "indefeas-
ible" was used in an earlier decision to indicate that the statute
was not applicable to conveyances which would be formally
sufficient to pass an estate in fee simple if the grantor had had
title at the time.3 3 The present Kansas statute is identical to
this last revision of the Missouri statute.
3 4
Type Five. It will be remembered that California used the
Missouri act of 1835 until the adoption of the Civil Code in 1872.
In that year, a new statute, brief and to-the-point, appeared:
Where a person purports by proper instrument to grant
real property in fee simple, and subsequently acquires any
title, or claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation
of law to the grantee, or his successors.3 5
This statute, like the earlier ones, seems to contemplate the
actual passage of title to the grantee by operation of law. It has
been borrowed by Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota and Mon-
tana.36 A subsequently acquired "claim of title" would seem to
embrace estates less than fee simple and equitable claims. Does
the statute apply to grants purporting to transfer interests or
estates less than fee simple? Like all the Missouri statutes, it is
ambiguous in this respect.
26 Kan. 664 (1881); cf. Frank v. Caruthers, 108 Mo. 569, 18 S. W. 927(1892) ; Porter v. Lafferty, 33 Iowa 254 (1871).
32. Mo. GEN. STAT. c. 108, § 3 (1866).
33. Boagy v. Shoab, 13 Mo. 365 (1850). In most states, technical words
of inheritance are not necessary to convey or create an estate in fee simple,
and by statute such an estate is presumed to be created unless a contrary
intent appears in the conveyance. In Texas, a deed sufficient to create a
fee simple under such statutes will raise an estoppel. Lindsay v. Freeman,
83 Tex. 259, 18 S. W. 727 (1892) ; of. Molina v. Ramirez, 15 Ariz. 249, 138
Pac. 17 (1914).
34. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 67-207 (1935).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE, Div. 2, Ft. 4, tit. 4 c. 2, Art. 2, § 1106 (Deering,
1949). See also § 2930 to the effect that an after-acquired title of a mort-
gagor "inures" to the mortgagee as security for the debt "in like manner
as if acquired before the execution.' The mortgage statute appeared for
the first time in 1872. The 1850 statute was held to be applicable to mort-
gages as well as deeds in Clark v. Baker, 14 Cal. 612 (1860). The history
of these statutes was recently traced in Barberi v. Rothchild, 7 Cal. App.
2d 537, 61 P. 2d 760 (1936), holding that the 1872 mortgage statute applies
as well to trust deeds.
36. IDAHO CODE § 55-811 (1948; N. D. REV. CODE § 47-1015 (1943);
S. D. CODE § 51.1414(4) 1939) (§ 51.1403 expressly states that the statu-
tory form of quitclaim deed shall not extend to an after-acquired title);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-1609 (1947).
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Miscellaneous Statutes. The Washington statute combines the
principle of the Iowa statute that the after-acquired title shall
"inure to the benefit" of the conveyee with a provision that the
title so acquired shall "pass to and vest in" the conveyee. 7 It
undoubtedly operates, as do the Missouri and California acts, to
transfer the title to the conveyee. The Oklahoma statute pro-
vides that "all rights" subsequently acquired "shall accrue to the
benefit" of the grantee or mortgagee and be "covered" by the
mortgage or deed. 8 The Georgia statute merely provides that
the "maker of a deed" is "estopped from denying his right to sell
and convey" when he later acquires title.39 Ohio appears to be
the only state having a special statute making it criminal to
convey, with intent to defraud, land which the grantor does not
own either in law or equity.40
Of all the statutes considered above, the Virginia statute,
adopted in 1919, is the most comprehensive. 41 It was apparently
passed for the very purpose of clarifying the Virginia law as to
the manner in which the doctrine operates. The title subse-
quently acquired is said to vest in the grantee as though the
grantor had had title at the time of the original conveyance.
This overrules thee "trust theory" adopted in earlier decisions of
the Virginia court.42 Moreover, the statute is expressly made
applicable only as between "the parties." The most confusing
feature of the statute is that it purports to apply to deeds of
personal as well as real property, provided the property is de-
scribed with "reasonable certainty." This appears to be the only
statute applicable to chattels, and the broad scope of the statute
is likely to cause considerable litigation in the future.
37. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10571 (Remington, 1931). Section 10554
provides that the statutory form of quitclaim does not extend to an after-
acquired title "unless words are added expressing such intention." See also
MINi'. STAT. ANN. § 507.07 (1947).
38. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 17 (1936).
39. GA. CODE § 29-111 (1933). Section 38-115 contains an unusual pro-
vision that a party claiming an estoppel "must not only be ignorant of the
true title, but also of any convenient means of acquiring such knowledge."
When both grantor and grantee have equal knowledge, there is no estoppel.
Apparently this estoppel statute is intended to apply to estoppel by deed
as well as estoppel in pais.
40. OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 13125 (Page 1937)
41. VA. CODE § 5202 (1919); VA. CODE 15202 (1942) and reviser's note
following statute.
42. See note 9 supra.
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II. THE EFFECT OF THE STATUTES
In appraising the statutes, it should be observed at the outset
that most jurisdictions do not appear to regard their statutes as
completely replacing the general law on estoppel by deed.43 The
statutes generally are broader than the common law rules as to
the type of deed which may be the basis for an estoppel.44 They
are narrower than the common law rules when, for example, it
is stated that an estoppel arises only when there is a conveyance
in fee simple45 Where the statute is more confined than the
general law, that should not necessarily preclude the application
of estoppel principles in a proper case. This construction of the
statutes is entirely desirable, since most of them are not thought-
fully drafted. Admittedly, it minimizes the effect of the statutes.
Occasionally, the statutes have had the desirable effect of making
certain types of future interests, inalienable under the common
law, transferable at least by way of estoppel.46
The principal vice of the statute seems to be that it has en-
couraged many courts to disregard intervening equities simply
because the statutory mandate that the title "immediately
passes" to the grantee when acquired by the grantor is thought
to be without exception. Practically all the statutes discussed
above lend themselves to the construction that the after-acquired
title actually passes to the estoppel grantee. That theory has also
been adopted in some states without a statute.47 The undesirable
effect of this interpretation of the statute is best illustrated by
43. See Barberi v. Rothchild, 7 Cal. App. 2d 537, 61 P. 2d 760 (1936);
Simonton, Statutory Covenants for Title in Missouri, 28 U. OF Mo. BULL
L. Ssn. 3, 30 (1923).
44. Field, J., in Clark v. Baker, 14 Cal. 612, 626-627 (1860): "By the
common law there were only two classes of conveyances which were held
to operate upon the after-acquired title-those by feoffment, by fine, or by
common recovery-and this from their solemnity and publicity, and those
by indenture of lease from the implied covenants arising upon such in-
dentures. No other forms of conveyance, in the absence of covenants of
warranty, had any effect in transferring the title subsequently acquired."
The Court then held that the estoppel by deed statute of 1850 changed
the common law rule as to deeds operating under that Statute of Uses.
That section gives to such deeds "an operation equivalent to the most
expressive covenant of warranty." 14 Cal. at 630.
45. See note 8 supra, as to estates for years.
46. There are many Illinois decisions. For recent cases, see Pure Oil Co.
v. Miller-McFarland Drilling Co., 376 Ill. 486, 34 N. E. 2d 854 (1941);
Brown v. Hall, 385 Ill. 260, 52 N. E. 2d 781 (1944); Citizens Nat'l. Bank
of Alton v. Glassbrenner, 377 Ill. 270, 36 N. E. 2d 364 (1941).
47. See note 51 infra.
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the problems referred to in the introduction to this comment.
These are now considered.
Right of election. Must the estoppel grantee accept the after-
acquired title or may he elect to sue on the covenants which may
be present in the deed? Since both the covenants and the estoppel
principle are designed to protect the grantee, he should be en-
titled to elect his remedy, even though he may benefit thereby
because of any change in the value of the land. The leading case
is Resser v. Carney,48 in which the Minnesota court held that the
acquisition of title by the grintor after the grantee has com-
menced an action on the covenants did not defeat the action. The
same result should obtain where title is acquired prior to insti-
tuting the action. Missouri and Illinois, under the estoppel stat-
utes, have held otherwise, however.4 9
The subsequent purchaser. If the statutory theory that title
passes immediately upon acquisition were strictly followed, the
estoppel grantee would in all cases prevail over subsequent pur-
chasers without actual notice from the grantor after the latter
acquires title. The reason is that the estoppel grantor would have
no title to convey to the subsequent purchaser. On the face of it,
that seems to be an undesirable result. Clearly the correct inter-
pretation of the estoppel statute is that it does not represent an
absolute rule subject to no qualifications. A frequent exception is
made where there is a subsequent purchase-money mortgage."
Why should another exception not be made in favor of the bona
48. 52 Minn. 397, 54 N. W. 89 (1893).
49. King v. Gilson's Adm'x, 32 Ill. 348 (1863); Reese v. Smith, 12 Mo.
344 (1849). In the Reese case, the wife who later acquired title had joined
in the conveyance with her husband, but under Missouri law she was not
bound by the covenants for title. The court reasoned that since she was
not bound by the covenants, her after-acquired title would not pass to the
grantee. Hence she had no defense in a law action brought against the
husband's estate on the covenants. She was permitted, however, to bring
an equity action to compel grantee to take a conveyance of the title ac-
quired by her after the grantee's action had commenced, and to enjoin
the grantee from collecting his judgment on the covenants. The court also
stated that if the husband had acquired the title, it would have passed to
the grantee in mitigation of damages.
50. Wendler v. Lambeth, 163 Mo. 428, 63 S. W. 684 (1901); Morgan v.
Graham, 35 Iowa 213 "(1872). In the Morgan case, the court regarded this
as an exception to the estoppel statute. Ordinarily, title passes immedi-
ately to the estoppel grantee, but this "rule must be reasonably construed,
so as to effectuate, and not so as to defeat the purposes of justice. . ..
It was regarded as reasonable that the title should inure to the grantee
subject to all the "conditions and equities which attach to it in the hands
of the grantor." 35 Iowa at 216. Moreover, so long as the estoppel grantee
has not changed his position in reliance upon the after-acquired title, it is
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fide purchaser? Although there has not been complete uniformity
in the treatment of the problem in jurisdictions having estoppel
statutes, these states are more inclined to favor the estoppel
grantee. A few states apply the passage of title concept to give
priority to the estoppel grantee in the absence of an estoppel
statute.51
It is apparent that the estoppel statute conflicts here with the
recording act. Conceivably the estoppel grantee may lose out
solely on the basis of the recording act if he failed to record his
conveyance, or he may prevail without recording if the subse-
quent conveyee had actual notice of the prior deed,52 was a
mere donee, 53 or, for some reason, failed to qualify under the
recording act.54 If the estoppel deed is recorded, it becomes a
question of constructive notice. Is the subsequent purchaser
charged with a duty to inspect the records to determine whether
his grantor has made any conveyances prior to acquiring title?
Under the grantor-grantee system of indexing deeds and mort-
gages, used in most states, it would be difficult although not im-
possible to discover the prior deed. Accordingly, the better cases
have reached the conclusion that there is no constructive notice,
and the subsequent purchaser will prevail.5 5 The estoppel statute
has not deterred the Missouri court from holding that such re-
immaterial whether or not the purchase-money mortgage is executed simul-
taneously with the deed conveying title to the estoppel grantor.
51. Ayer v. Philadelphia & Boston Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34
N. E. 177 (1893); McCusker v. McEvey, 9 R. 1. 528 (1870); Jarvis v.
Aikens, 25 Vt. 635 (1853). These decisions indicate that the estoppel
grantee prevails even if the subsequent purchaser is assumed to be bona
fide.
52. Hamblin v. Woolley, 64 Ariz. 152, 167 P. 2d 100 (1946); Merrill v.
Clark, 103 Cal. 367, 37 Pac. 238 (1894) ; Ketchum v. Pleasant Valley Coal
Co., 257 Fed. 274 (8th Cir. 1919); see Barker v. Circle, 60 Mo. 258, 264(1875). In Yamie v. Willmott, 184 Okla. 382, 88 P. 2d 325 (1939), there
was a reconveyance by the estoppel grantor to the true owner. Held, that
the estoppel grantee prevails. The court did not clearly indicate, however,
that the subsequent purchaser (the true owner) was without actual notice.
From the facts, it seems likely that he had notice.
53. Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S. W. 727 (1892).
54. In some jurisdictions, the subsequent purchaser is required to record
before the prior grantee in order to obtain the protection of the recording
act.
55. The following cases are from jurisdiction where there are no estoppel
by deed statutes. Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 55 Atl. 670 (1903);
Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 93 S. C. 254, 75 S. E. 371(1912); Builders Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259
(1921); Breen v. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S. W. 1047 (1911); Heffron
v. Flanigan, 37 Mich. 274 (1877). A number of these cases emphasize that
the first grantee was negligent in not checking the record to determine
whether his grantor had title. For cases contra, see note 51 supra.
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corded deeds are not "'in the line of title' as that term is used
by conveyancers and searchers."56 These decisions appear to be
in accord with the prevailing practice of title searchers. The
contrary cases are influenced by the wording of the estoppel
statute to the effect that the title later acquired passes immedi-
ately or by operation of law to the grantee.5 8 In 1941 Idaho
passed a satute making the recording of a conveyance, executed
by one who has no title, constructive notice from the time the
estoppel grantor's deed from the true owner is recorded. 9 This
statute seems undesirable. It is nteworthy that the Idaho legis-
lature apparently did not feel that the estoppel statute accom-
plished this purpose of itself. In states where there is an official
tract index, it would be simple to find the prior deed, and the
estoppel grantee might very well be favored on that ground.",
56. Ford v. Unity Church Soc. of St. Joseph, 120 Mo. 498, 25 S. W. 394,
398 (1894). Also Dodd v. Williams, 3 Mo. App. 278 (1877); Ellsberry v.
Duval-Percival Trust Co., 220 Mo. App. 239, 282 S. W. 1054 (1926); cf.
Organ v. Bunnell, 184 S. W. 102 (Mo. 1916). See also Final Report of Title
Standards Committee, 3 J. Mo. BAR 225 (1947), as to proposed title stand-
ard where the abstract reveals a deed by one who has no -record interest
and who is not in possession. Proposed Title Standard 4 states that the
deed may be disregarded if the instrument has been of record at least ten
years. This title standard would not appear to be applicable to the situation
under consideration since the estoppel grantor has a record interest.
57. See PATTON, TITLES § 42 (1938) as to methods of using name indices;
see also Johnson, Title Examination in Massachusetts, CASNER AND
LEACH, CASES ON PROPERTY 886, 903 (1st stan. ed. 1950), where it is stated
that it is not the practice to examine the index prior to the time an owner
acquired title, even though the estoppel grantee prevails in Massachusetts.
See note 51 supra.
58. See particularly Bernardy v. Colonial & U. S. Mtg. Co., Ltd., 17 S. D.
637, 98 N. W. 166 (1904) where it was felt that the policy of the estoppel
statute would be defeated if the subsequent purchaser were to prevail.
When the case came up the second time, the decision was reaffirmed. 20
S. D. 193, 105 N. W. 737 (1905). Accord: Tilton v. Flormann, 22 S. D.
324, 117 N. W. 377 (1908) (the estoppel grantee was actually in possession
although the court made no point of that fact) ; Osceola Land Co. v. Chicago
Mill & Lumber Co., 84 Ark. 1, 103 S. W. 609 (1907); see Colonial & U. S.
Mtg. Co. v. Lee, 95 Ark. 253, 129 S. W. 84 (1910). In Iowa the early cases
favor the estoppel grantee with little discussion of the problem. Warburton
v. Mattox, Morris 367 (Iowa 1844); Van Orman v. McGregor, 23 Iowa 300(1867); but see Higgins v. Dennis, 104 Iowa 605, 610, 74 N. W. 9 (1898).
59. Idaho Laws 1941 c. 119, § 1; IDAHO CODE § 55-811 (1948). The
estoppel statute in § 55-605 is identical to the present California Act. The
Idaho statute was apparently designed to change the rule in Jackson v. Lee,
47 Idaho 589, 277 Pac. 548 (1929) that a deed recorded by one who was at
the time a stranger to the title is not constructive notice.
60. Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 Pac. 434 (1899). In the case of
Bernardy v. Colonial & U. S. Mtg. Co., Ltd., 17 S. D. 637, 98 N. W. 166(1904), the court buttressed its holding by stating that the South Dakota
statutes require a "numerical index to be kept of both city and farm prop-
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A subsequent mortgagee, who is not a purchase-money mort-
gagee, is in the same position under most recording acts as the
subsequent purchaser.
Judgment creditors. In some jurisdictions, a judgment credi-
tor is protected under the recording act as a bona fide purchaser.
Where that is the case, the creditor's good faith will determine
the question of priority over an estoppel grantee.6 1
In other jurisdictions, it may be necessary to observe when
the creditor recovered and docketed his judgment. It is assumed
that the judgment may create a lien on after-acquired property.
If there is a single judgment recovered prior to the purported
conveyance by the judgment debtor, there is authority from
Kansas that the estoppel grantee takes the after-acquired title
subject to the judgment lien.6 2 Other states reach a different
result on the theory that when the judgment debtor acquires
title he is a "mere conduit" through whom the title passes to the
grantee.6 3 As the Montana court put it: ".... under the doctrine
of instantaneous seizin there is no moment of time when the
lien of the judgment could have attached; it is as though the title
had passed direct from his grantor to his grantee."64 A similar
result was reached in Oklahoma, although the court observed
that this result was "independent of the question of fraud. 6 5
There is some basis for preferring the creditor in cases such as
the Kansas decision where the judgment debtor conveyed land
which he expected to inherit from his mother.6 There seems to
be little justification for deciding these cases on the ficticious
notion of "shooting title" or "instantaneous seisin." It is note-
worthy that these cases arose in jurisdictions having estoppel
statutes, and that different results have been reached despite the
statutes.
There is less reason to prefer the creditor where the judgment
erty. Under such a system, abstracts will necessarily show all the convey-
ances made of the property." Id. at 649, 98 N. W. at 170.
61. Gallagher v. Stern, 250 Pa. 292, 95 Atl. 518 (1915), discussed in
Lawler, Estoppel to Assert An After-Acquired Title in Pennsylvania, 3
U. OF PITT. L. REv. 165 (1937); 29 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1916).
62. Bliss v. Brown, 78 Kan. 467, 96 Pac. 945 (1908); Note, 22 HARV.
L. REv. 136, 137 (1908).
63. Watkins v. Wassell, 15 Ark. 73 (1854); Johannes v. Dwire, 94 Mont.
590, 23 P. 2d 971 (1933); Brown v. Barker, 35 Okla. 498, 130 Pac. 155
(1912).
64. Johannes v. Dwire, 94 Mont. 590, 594, 23 P. 2d 971, 972 (1933).
65. Brown v. Barker, 35 Okla. 498, 501, 130 Pac. 155, 156 (1912).
66. Bliss v. Brown, 78 Kan. 467, 98 Pac. 945 (1908).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
lien is acquired between the time of the estoppel conveyance and
the acquisition of title. Priority should be given to the estoppel
grantee.67 In the rare case where the conveyance is designed to
defraud the creditor and the grantee is aware of that fact, a
different result might well be reached. If the judgment is not
recovered until after the acquisition of title by the estoppel
grantor, the judgment creditor is not preferred 8 unless he enjoys
the protection of a purchaser under the recording act.,,
Other "privies" of the grantor. If the estoppel grantee dies
after acquiring title, his heirs are bound by the estoppel. A
different result would, of course, be reached if the heir himself
acquired the title from an independent source.70 If the estoppel
grantor is unmarried at the time of the conveyance, but marries
prior to acquisition of title, the spouse acquires no inchoate
dower right. This would seem to follow whether the after-ac-
quired title is regarded as passing to the grantee or as held
merely for his benefit. Even under the later theory, the general
rule that there is no dower in the land held in trust would seem
to apply.71 A more serious question arises where the grantor is
married at the time of the original conveyance. If she joins in
the conveyance, she is estopped to assert a dower right.7 2 On the
other hand, is she does not join, perhaps she should not be de-
prived of dower, since the conveyance may have been in antici-
pation of acquiring title and for the very purpose of defeating
her dower claim.
Strangers to the transaction claiming benefit of the estoppel.
In a few jurisdictions, the passage of title concept has assumed
some importance in connection with the question whether per-
sons who were not parties or their privies to the conveyance may
take advantage of the estoppel. Thus, if the estoppel grantor
sues an adverse possessor in ejectment, the defendant may defeat
the action by showing that the title has passed to the estoppel
grantee.7 3 In a different type of case, Missouri has regarded the
estoppel as being invocable only by the grantee or his privies.74
67. Lamprey v. Pike, 28 Fed. 30 (C. C. D. Minn. 1886); Clark v. Daniels,
'77 Mich. 26, 43 N. W. 854 (1889); but see Leslie v. Harrison Natl. Bank,
97 Kan. 22, 154 Pac. 209 (1916).
68. Rice v. Kelso, 57 Iowa 115, 7 N. W. 3 (1880), 10 N. W. 335 (1881).
69. See note 61 supra.
70. Wilson v. Godfrey, 145 Iowa 696, 124 N. W. 875 (1910).
71. See PATTON, TITLES § 337 (1938).
72. McDaniel v. Large, 55 Iowa 312, 7 N. W. 632 (1880).
73. Perkins v. Coleman, 90 Ky. 611, 14 S. W. 640 (1890).
74. Pullen v. Hart, 293 Mo. 61, 238 S. W. 437 (1021); see also Jordan
v. Chambers, 226 Pa. 573, 75 Atl. 956 (1910).
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CONCLUSION
The estoppel by deed statutes have contributed little of value
to the general law on the subject. They have fostered an ap-
proach to the rule that is undesirable because it is rigid and
mechanical. The salutary policies behind estoppel by deed and
the recording acts are lost when the "shooting title" concept is
applied to defeat the subsequent bona fide purchaser or mort-
gagee from the estoppel grantor. The purpose of estoppel by
deed is defeated when the estoppel grantee is denied the right
of election. Under modern title examination practices, if anyone
is at fault in the subsequent purchaser situation, it is the first
grantee.
The statutes are objectionable for another reason. In general,
they are drafted in such a manner as to create rather embarrass-
ing construction problems for the courts. To avoid an unjust
application of the statute, many courts have had to ignore what
appears to be the plain meaning of the language. In short, most
courts have not taken the statutes very seriously. The Iowa-
Nebraska type of statute is the most thoughtfully drafted. If
the statutes are to be retained at all, they should be amended to
include the following features if they are not present.
The statute should apply to any conveyance in which the
grantor purports to own and to convey an estate of a particular
quantum, whether in fee or less. The statute should apply to an
after-acquired estate which is less in quantum than the estate
which the grantor purported to convey. If the after-acquired
interest is greater than the estate purported to be conveyed, it
should be indicated that the estoppel principle is coextensive with
the original conveyance and subject to all its terms and restric-
tions. The later acquired title, whether legal or equitable, should
inure to the benefit of the grantee, his heirs or assigns. Any
reference to the title "immediately passing" or passing "by oper-
ation of law" should be eliminated. The statute should expressly
save from its application the bona fide purchaser and right of
election situations. Recording prior to acquisition of title should
not constitute constructive notice. The estoppel grantee should
be permitted to protect himself by re-recording his conveyance
after the title has been acquired by his grantor. The right of a
spouse joining in the conveyance solely for the purpose of re-
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linquishing dower should be specifically defined. The statute
should have no application to personal property.
When these changes are made, the statute could not be re-
garded as objectionable. It might well be maintained, however,
that the statute is then unnecessary!
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